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CASES NOTED
CIVIL RIGHTS-DISCRIMINATION IN THE SALE OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY
Attracted by an advertisement in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the
Joneses attempted to buy a house in Alfred H. Mayer's private subdivi-
sion. They could not, however, solely because Mr. Jones was black, and
it was company policy not to sell to Negroes. Relying in part on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1964),' the Joneses sought an injunction to enforce their federal
right to buy property. The district court held that the subdivision's func-
tioning as a municipality and its being subjected to licensing, zoning, and
other governmental regulations did not constitute the requisite state
involvement necessary to invoke section 1982, and dismissed the com-
plaint;I the Eighth Circuit affirmed.3 On certiorari,4 the Supreme Court,
in a case of first impression, held, reversed: Section 1982, properly enacted
under the thirteenth amendment, empowers the federal courts to grant in-
junctive relief to those who have been discriminated against on the basis
of race in the sale or rental of any property. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 88 S. Ct. 2186 (1968).
The price the Court has paid for this undoubtedly moral and socio-
logically prudent decision is nonconformity with most of the precedent
on the subject. Previously, courts have turned their backs on racial dis-
crimination in the sale of private property by traveling two parallel and
related routes, viz., a policy of abstention from any totally non-govern-
mental sphere of activity, and judicial emasculation of the thirteenth
amendment,5 and its progeny, section 1982. Finding force in the common
law penchant for looking with disfavor on restrictions on the alienation of
land,' and in the concept of due process of law, 7 judicial reluctance to in-
1. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right .. . as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." Originally enacted in 1866 as ch. 31, § 1, 14 STAT. 27, this section was reenacted
in substantially the same form by the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 STAT.
140, 144. Although codified in the Revised Statutes of 1874 as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 for a
number of years, hereinafter it will be referred to by its present codification, § 1982.
2. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
3. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
4. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 389 U.S. 986 (1967).
5. "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, . . . shall exist within the
United States ....
"Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
6. E.g., Bean v. Patterson, 122 U.S. 496, 499 (1887) ("that absolute power which a man
possesses over his own property, by which he can make any disposition of it . . ."). See
generally Friedman, The Law of the Living, The Law of the Dead: Property, Succession and
Society, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 340, 355-65; Hecht, From Seisin to Sit-In: Evolving Property
Concepts, 44 B.U.L. Rev. 435, 440 (1964). But see Rice, Bias in Housing: Toward a New
Approach, 6 Santa Clara Lawyer 162, 166 (1966):
It is important to note here that there is no absolute right to own and dispose of
property. Consistent with the Constitution as well as the moral idea of stewardship
of wealth, the right of property can be subjected by law to reasonable regulations
for the common good.
7. See Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 331 (1964):
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terfere with private discrimination has been rooted, to a large measure,
in the use and interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.8 Since our
courts have insisted, albeit with increasing liberality, that some degree of
state involvement was necessary to summon the fourteenth amendment to
vindicate a deprivation of civil rights,9 purely private action, by default,
lay beyond the ambit of judicial protection.1" Indeed, the "right" of an
individual to discriminate had been so firmly entrenched, 1 that even
sympathetic judges12 preferred to redraw "the line"' 3 on state action,
rather than conceptually tread on private rights.
Although there were strong indications that the sweep of the thir-
teenth amendment was intended to be quite broad,14 once enacted, the
treatment it received both in the lower courts," and later in the Supreme
Court, 6 was, at best, confining. The Emancipation Amendment was, of
course, not burdened by the "state action" limitation of the fourteenth,
[W]hen one party is unwilling, as when the property owner chooses not to sell to
a particular person or not to admit that person, then, as this Court has emphasized,
...he is entitled to rely on the guarantee of due process of law ...and to know
that only by valid legislation, passed pursuant to some constitutional grant of power,
can anyone disturb this free use .... (emphasis his).
Apparently the Justice was not aware of section 1982, enacted ninety-eight years previous
to the making of this statement, which he, as a member of the majority in Jones, now con-
siders "valid legislation."
8. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. Compare Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) with Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See also Silard,
A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection
Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41
TEXAs L. REV. 347 (1963).
10. Johnson v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955); Hill v. Miller,
64 Cal. 2d 757, 415 P.2d 33, 51 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1966) ; Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130
Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 69 (1956); cf. Oliphant v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Eng'r, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 893 (1959) ; Ming v. Horgan, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 693 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; see also
MacGregor v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 99 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1958).
11. "There is a relative dearth of authority upon the matter, probably because the
property owner's right to deal with whom he pleases in this respect has been generally as-
sumed ... .'" Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 153, 155 (1950).
12. See, e.g., Judge Fuld dissenting in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512,
87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), in a typical exercise in "'state action' metaphysics"; Kinoy, The
Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387 (1967).
13. Hackley v. Art Builder's, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 851, 857 (D. Md. 1960).
14. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2202-05 (1968) ; Gressman, The Un-
happy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mica. L. REV. 1323 (1952) ; Kinoy, supra
note 12.
15. LeGrand v. United States, 12 F. 577 (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1882) ; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind.
327 (1874); Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush.) 5 (1867). See also Charge to Grand
Jury-Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 1005 (No. 18,260) (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1875). Contra,
United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
16. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) ; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905) ; United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d
475 (2d Cir. 1964). Contra, People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198 (1870).
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and "[clothed] Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper
for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States
.. .))18 Paradoxically, the prevailing view was that to make it applicable
to acts of racial discrimination "would be running the slavery argument
into the ground .... "I' Despite a unique federal case20 and the enlight-
ened, vigorous dissents of the first Mr. Justice Harlan21 arguing that Negro
freedom is meaningless without freedom from discrimination, the thir-
teenth amendment, until resurrected in Jones, remained overwhelmed by
the weight of authority.
22
While the thirteenth amendment was being bludgeoned by narrow
judicial interpretation, section 1982 was also falling on hard times.25 Due
to fears of the growing impotence of the amendment under which it was
enacted, Congress reenacted section 1982 under the fourteenth 4 in order
to eliminate any doubts of its validity. Rather than renewing any vitality
the law may have had, the reenactment gave the Court a chance to vitiate
further the rights of the Freedmen25 by ruling, in effect, that to preserve
the validity of the Civil Rights Acts, they must be construed as being
directed only at state action. 21 With only slight authority to the contrary,
2 7
18. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
19. Id. at 24.
20. United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903). As the Jones opinion noted,
88 S. Ct. at 2192-93, this was the only case to pass directly on the validity of the thirteenth
amendment in relation to section 1982. Upholding an indictment of conspiracy to prevent
Negroes from occupying land, Judge Treiber held that:
[Clongress has the power, under the provisions of the thirteenth amendment, to
protect citizens of the United States in the enjoyment of those rights which are
fundamental and belong to every citizen, if the deprivation of these privileges [one
of which is the right to lease land] is solely on account of his race or color ....
United States v. Morris, supra at 330.
21. E.g.: "[Tiheir freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against,
all discrimination against them, because of their race . . . ." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
36; see Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 20-38 (1906); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
553-64 (1896).
22. In Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), the Court struck a federal indict-
ment charging conspiracy to prevent Negroes from enforcing labor contracts at a saw mill.
Limiting federal jurisdiction under the thirteenth amendment only to acts of actual slavery
or involuntary servitude, the Court said the authority to enforce such as those protected by
section 1982 resides only in the several states.
Twenty years later, the thirteenth was weakened further in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271
U.S. 323 (1926), wherein defendant's appeal of an injunction prohibiting him from selling
to Negroes in violation of a restrictive covenant was dismissed with strong dictum as to the
amendment's frailty.
23. See Gressman, supra note 14, and authorities cited therein.
24. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2201-02; see note 1 supra.
25. Relying on C. WooDwARD, REUNION AND REACTION (1951), Prof. Kinoy, supra note
12, at 396-99, suggests that the majority of the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883), which set the tone for many years to come, endeavored, and were successful, to
reflect the Compromise of 1877 by shifting the primary responsibility of enforcement of
Negro rights to the states.
26. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (dictum); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 312
(1879) (dictum).
27. United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903) ; see Judge Edgerton dissenting
in Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 235-46 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Beech
Grove Inv. Co. v. Civil Rights Comm'n, - Mich. -, 157 N.W.2d 213, 229 (1968) (Souris, J.
1968]
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subsequent decisions bore the mark of this politically motivated heritage
of restraint,2 1 and section 1982 fell into desuetude.
Bent on adding another rung to its ladder of decisions which aim at
securing the black man's proper place in American society, the Justices
of the Supreme Court plunged headlong into this impressively large, if per-
haps specious, body of authority. They distinguished; 29 they disap-
proved;," they overruled; 3' they incorporated the dissents of the first
Mr. Justice Harlan; 32 they went to great lengths to ascertain the intent
of Congress.33 Despite this faqade of legal gymnastics, the entire thrust
of this landmark decision, which appears to suggest otherwise, is a re-
versal of a century of judicial thinking vis-h-vis the thirteenth amend-
ment and section 1982:
Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment
rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of
slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into
effective legislation.
3 4
Hence, section 1982 "must encompass every racially motivated refusal
to sell or rent and cannot be confined to officially sanctioned segregation
in housing.""3 Although there will surely be those who insist that "the
Supreme Court is tellin' me how to sell my house," the result merely
forbids one who has placed his property on the market from discriminat-
ing against a potential buyer on the basis of race, lest the power of a.
federal injunction be brought to bear.
In light of the constitutionally expansive direction in which the Su-
preme Court has been moving, a finding for the petitioner in Jones, despite
the "good law to the contrary,"'36 should astonish no one. 7 The Court's
concurring) ("It is my opinion that that federal statute elevated to the rank of civil right
the right, among others listed, to purchase real property .... ").
28. Dicta in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948) ("The action toward which the
provisions of the statute under consideration is directed is governmental action."); Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948) ("By federal statute, enacted before the Fourteenth
Amendment but vindicated by it, the states must accord to all citizens the right to take and
hold real property.") ; Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60 (1917); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Moffett v. Commerce Trust
Co., 75 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Mo. 1947), aff'd, 187 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1951).
29. E.g., section 1982's limitation to state action as found in the authorities cited note 26
supra was found to be dictum. 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2193 n.25 (1968).
30. It is true that a dictum in Hurd v. Hodge ... characterized Corrigan v. Buckley
• . . as having 'held' that '[tihe action toward which the provisions of the statute
• . . [are] directed is governmental action.' . . . But no such statement appears in
the Corrigan opinion, and a careful examination of Corrigan reveals that it cannot
be read as authority for the proposition attributed to it in Hurd.
Id.
31. 88 S. Ct. at 2205 n.78: "Insofar as Hodges is inconsistent with our holding today, it
is hereby overruled."
32. Id. at 2204-05.
33. Over sixty percent of the majority opinion concerns itself with debates of the Re-
construction Congresses that tend to support their conclusion.
34. 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2203-04 (1968).
35. Id. at 2194.
36. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33, 43 (8th Cir. 1967).
37. In affirming the complaint's dismissal, apparently against their "personal inclinations,"
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thirteenth amendment methodology, however, was, to some extent, unex-
pected. The petitioners' alternative ground for relief-that the public
nature of the subdivision38 and its other governmental relationships such
as licensing39 should place them under the fourteenth amendment um-
brella-led some to speculate that an extension of the "state action"
concept would be the grounds for reversal.40 It has been suggested that
a state's failure to deal with discrimination, i.e. state inaction, would be a
sufficient violation of fourteenth amendment rights.4 ' Still others, since
the "elastic in the concept [of state action] can be stretched just so
far,"42 would hold that under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment43
Congress is not limited by the "state action" of section 1," and may
therefore reach purely private action in protecting the privileges and
immunities of United States citizens.45 Nevertheless, the Court chose to
take some pressure off the fourteenth amendment, and its action harbours
profound implications for lawmakers, as well as for the law itself.
Perhaps the most significant of these is the powerful new tool it gives
legislatures to deal with problems of racial discrimination. Unlike the
1870's, it is no longer "running the slavery argument into the ground '4
to label private acts of discrimination badges of servitude. Conservative
jurisdictions now automatically have a rather pervasive fair housing law.
Congress and those states which would have taken the initiative to attack
any form of racial discrimination now have extra constitutional ammu-
id., the Eighth Circuit presaged what was to follow: "It would not be too surprising if the
Supreme Court one day were to hold that a court errs when it dismisses a complaint of this
kind." Id. at 44. For the definitive analysis of predictability in courts of appeals see K.
LLE WELLYN, THE CoMMON LAW TRADITION (1960).
38. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
39. There is no difference, as I see it, between a State authorizing a licence to prac-
tice racial discrimination and a State, without any express authorization of that kind
nevertheless . . . the operation of a licensing system in an environment where the
whole weight of the system is on the side of discrimination.
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 385 (1967) (Douglas, J. concurring) ; see also Mr. Justice
Douglas concurring in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
40. 53 CORNELL L. REV. 314 (1968); 16 KAN. L. REv. 247 (1968); 33 Mo. L. REV. 140
(1968) ; 21 VAo. L. REV. 271 (1968). Some of these articles also displayed a degree of
skepticism about the possibility of the Court using the grounds it did for reversal.
41. See Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against
Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964); Silard, supra note 9; cf. Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961):
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made itself a
party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and
prestige behind the admitted discrimination.
42. Kinoy, supra note 12, at 417.
43. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
44. Notes 9 and 10 supra, and accompanying text.
45. This was originally the thesis of the first Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 5 (1883). It reappears in language in United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1966) (Clark, Black, and Fortas, JJ. concurring) and Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279-86 (1964) (Douglas, J. concurring). See
generally Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, The Civil Rights Bill of 1966, and the Right
to Buy Property, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 274 (1967).
46. Note 20 supra, and accompanying text.
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nition. In fact, the impact can already be noticed in New York where
Jones was relied on to sustain the state's anti-discrimination law.47
Besides laying a broader foundation for future laws, and Mr. Justice
Stewart's suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding,8 Jones renders
much of the Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 196849 aca-
demic." Effective January 1, 1969,"' the Act declares discrimination in
the offer or sale of housing because of race, color, religion, or national
origin illegal.52 In addition to procedural differences,58 it exempts from its
coverage the "Mrs. Murphy's Boarding House" dwelling unit, 4 non-
residential property,5" single family housing,"6 sale of property without
the services of a real estate agent,57 and property of religious groups.58
However, Jones, as far as discrimination based on race is concerned,
covers all property. Between the two exists a gap wherein housing dis-
crimination for non-racial reasons in the areas excluded from the Act
find no prohibition. Yet the fact that in this country the Negro is the
most frequent sufferer of discrimination overshadows the above limitation
in the present law. It may also be noted that the Court withheld judg-
ment as to whether section 1982 allows for compensatory and punitive
damages,59 both provided for in the new Act. 0 This appears to be a
logical and anticipated extension of the instant case.6 ' Moreover, in the
47. State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Kennelly, 37 U.S.L.W. 2084 (N.Y. App. Div.
July 11, 1968). See also the Public Accommodations Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201-7, 78 Stat. 241 (1968), the validity of which was sustained in Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), on the basis of the Constitution's
commerce clause. Although it would take an explicit reversal of the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883), which tacitly took place in Jones anyway, today the Act could easily be sus-
tained on the basis of Jones.
48. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2189-90 (1968).
49. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
50. In Mr. Justice Harlan's words:
In effect, this Court, by its construction of § 1982, has extended the coverage of
federal "fair housing" laws far beyond that which Congress in its wisdom chose to
provide in the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
88 S. Ct. 2186, 2222 (1968).
51. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, § 803(a) (2) (1968).
52. ld. at § 804(a).
53. The provisions of the Act may be enforced by an administrative proceeding in the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, id. at § 810(a)-(f), an individual civil
action in either state or federal courts, id. at § 812(a), or a civil action instituted by the
Attorney General, id. at § 813(a).
54. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, § 803(b) (2) (1968):
[R]ooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to
be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other; if the
owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.
55. Id. § 802(b).
56. Id. § 803(b) (1).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 807.
59. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 88 S. Ct. at 2190.
60. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, § 812(c) (1968).
* 61. But see.Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 838 (1960), where the Court held the failure of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964) to specifically
1968] CASES. NOTED
light of the newly found illegality of private discrimination, some toughen-
ing of present federal regulations regarding construction financing62 can
be expected.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. will, of course, draw no commendation
from those who judge a decision by the degree of judicial restraint
therein. Yet, the realization that it goes far to attack that which spawns
segregated housing-so debilitating to the Negro and his quest for
equality-earns for this case a mark high in "the jurisprudence of a
nation striving to rejoin the human race."6
MARTIN ENGELS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE INTERFERENCE WITH
PRIVATE, CONSENSUAL MARITAL SEXUAL RELATIONS
Cotner pleaded guilty to his wife's charge that he had committed "the
abominable and detestable crime against nature"' with her2 in violation
of the Indiana sodomy statute.3 Neither the wife's affidavit nor the statute
provide for compensatory damages-which is true for § 1982-prevented a court from award-
ing them.
62. E.g., 24 C.F.R. § 200.315 (1968) (FHA); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4331 (1968) (VA).
63. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2208 n.6 (1968) (Douglas, J. con-
curring).
1. The "crime against nature" in more common parlance is termed "sodomy."
Sodomy historically and medically refers to anal intercourse, or buggery, but the
statutes on sodomy include all manner of sexual activity conceived by someone,
somewhere, at one time or another, to be "unnatural"; and this means, of course, in
this sexually repressed society, almost every variety of sexual activity other than
"natural" coitus. Sodomy laws thus cover, in one state or another, not only buggery,
but fellatio (oral-genital contact with the male), cunnilingus (oral-genital contact
with the female), homosexual behavior, bestiality (sex contact with animals),
necrophilia (sexual contact with the dead) and even mutual masturbation. Hefner,
The Legal Enforcement of Morality, 40 U. CoLo. L. REV. 199, 210 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
In Fine v. State, 153 Fla. 297, 300, 14 So.2d 408, 409 (1943), the Supreme Court of
Florida lamented that:
We have experienced some difficulty in determining precisely what unnatural
sexual acts do, and what do not constitute the crime. This is largely due to the
reluctance legal authors have shown to detail the facts they were considering, be-
cause they are always so shocking. This aversion was voiced by Blackstone in his
Commentaries over one hundred and fifty years ago: "I will not act so disagreeable
a part, to my readers as well as myself, as to dwell any longer upon a subject the
very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature." A similar attitude has been
expressed about even particularizing in the formal charge ....
For general understanding of sodomy laws, see Comment, Sodomy Statutes-A Need for
Change, 13 S.D.L. REV. 384 (1968); Hefner, The Legal Enforcement of Morality, supra, at
210-20; Note, Sodomy-Crime or Sin?, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 83 (1959); and Spence, The Law
of Crime Against Nature, 32 N.C.L. REV. 312 (1954).
2. The court held that he had standing to complain of unconstitutional state invasion of
marital privacy even though his wife was the complainant. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873,
875 n.2 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3123 (1968).
3. BURNS' IND. STAT. ch. 169, § 10-4221 (1965), quoted id. at n.3. The Florida statute,
FLA. STAT. § 800.01 (1967), is substantially similar. Other Florida statutes prohibit "any un-
natural and lascivious act," FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1967), lewd and lascivious behavior, FLA.
